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THE SUPREME COURT, RULE 1OB-5 AND THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE LAW

MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN*

INTRODUCTION

Beginning in 1975, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a series of cases that
effectively limited the reach of Rule 1Ob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,' the principal antifraud provision under the federal securities laws.2 The
Court did this either directly, by narrowly interpreting Rule 1Ob-5 and section

* Nicholas A. Rosenbaum Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. The
author wishes to thank his colleagues, Allison Eid, Robert Nagel, and Amy Schmitz, for their
helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this Article and Shane Nowell and Clifford
Scott for their research assistance.
1. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
191 (1994) (holding that there is no basis for aider and abettor liability under Rule 1Ob-5); Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983) (holding that an analyst who passed along material nonpublic
information about a public company to his clients did not violate Rule lob-5 because he did not
receive the information from someone who breached his fiduciary duty to the public company);
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551,555 (1982) (holding that neither a bank certificate of deposit
nor a private profit sharing arrangement was a security); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
235 (1980) (purchasing securities based on nonpublic information does not violate Rule lob-5
because the purchaser had no common law duty of disclosure to the sellers); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 570 (1979) (finding that a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan is
not an investment contract and therefore not a security); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462,475-76 (1977) (ruling that breach of fiduciary duty cannot be the basis for a claim under Rule
1Ob-5; the plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant engaged in manipulative or deceptive
conduct to state a claim under the Rule); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976)
(holding that negligence cannot be the basis for an action under Rule 1Ob-5 and that the plaintiff
must allege and prove scienter); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55
(1975) (finding that only purchasers and sellers of securities have standing to maintain a private
cause of action for damages under Rule lOb-5 and that mere offerees do not); see also Gustafson
v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 584 (1995) (holding that the remedy under section 12(a)(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933 is limited to purchasers of securities in a public offering by an issuer or a
controlling shareholder of the issuer).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998). The Rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
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10(b),3 on which the Rule is based, or by interpreting the definition of "security"
narrowly.4 In either case, the Court's apparent intent was to limit the reach of the
Rule. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor DrugStores,5 the Court held that a private
cause of action under the Rule was available only to purchasers and sellers of
securities.6 Offerees who alleged that they were dissuaded from purchasing stock
by an intentionally misleading prospectus thus lacked standing to maintain an
action. Although there was support for the plaintiffs' position, the Court opted
for a narrow reading by citing the threat of "vexatious litigation."7
The Court's skepticism of litigation under Rule 1Ob-5 was evident in several
other prominent decisions,' culminating in its 1994 decision in Central Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. FirstInterstateBank of Denver, N.A. 9 There, the Court denied
a cause of action under the Rule against alleged aiders and abettors of a primary
violator of the Rule.'° This decision was particularly striking because the issue
had not been raised by the defendant/petitioner in its initial appeal of an
unfavorable ruling below on other issues; rather, the Court directed the parties
to brief this issue in its grant of certiorari." The Court's decision was also
striking because the lower federal courts had consistently recognized an implied
right of action under Rule 1Ob-5 against aiders and abettors. 2 The Court in
CentralBank seemed to be intent on continuing to rein in Rule 1Ob-5 private
actions. One theme common to several of these cases, and especially prominent
in the 1977 decision of Santa Fe Industries,Inc. v. Green,1 3 was a recognition of
the possible role of state law in providing a remedy for the plaintiff. Even in the
absence of an express recognition of a role for the states, these decisions had the
effect of curbing national power, recognizing a limit to the growth of the "oak"

3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
4. See cases cited supra note 1.
5. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
6. Id.at 754-55.
7. Id.at 724. The Court reversed a contrary holding of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
ManorDrugStores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), rev "d,
421 U.S. 723 (1975),
and drew a stinging dissent from three Justices. Blue ChipStamps, 421 U.S. at 762 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he Court exhibits a preternatural solicitousness for corporate well-being and a
seeming callousness toward the investing public quite out of keeping, it seems to me, with our own
traditions and the intent of the securities laws.").
8. See cases cited supra note 1.
9. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
10. Id. at 191.
11. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 508 U.S. 959
(1993).
12. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In hundreds of judicial and
administrative proceedings in every Circuit in the federal system, the courts and the SEC have
concluded that aiders and abettors are subject to liability under § 10(b) and Rule lob-5.") (referring
to 5B A. JACOBs, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 1OB-5 § 40.02 (rev. ed. 1993)).
13. 430 U.S. 462,478 (1977).

2005]

FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE LAW

tree that litigation under the Rule had become. 4
The tendency to be stingy in anti-fraud cases was also evident in another
strain of Rule lOb-5 cases-the insider trader cases. In Chiarella v. United
States 5 and Dirks v. SEC, 6 the state law of fiduciary duty played a prominent
role in the Court's decision to reject claims that the defendants in those cases
engaged in insider trading in violation of Rule 1Ob-5. Not everyone in possession
of material, nonpublic information was prohibited from trading on or selectively
disclosing that information. 7 Only those who breached a fiduciary duty by
trading on the information, or those who received the information from someone
who breached a fiduciary duty, could violate the Rule.
Although this twenty-year history of jurisprudence was not without
exceptions, 8 the thrust of the Court's jurisprudence seemed undeniable. As the
1990s drew to a close, however, the Court seemed to adopt a different tack. In
the four most recent cases that it has decided under Rule 1Ob-5 and the federal
securities laws, the Court has expanded the reach of both. Even though each of
the decisions is defensible on its own terms, the cases taken together appear to
reject the philosophy of the Court's earlier decisions. In the sole case involving
a private action for damages, Wharf (Holdings)Ltd. v. United International
Holdings,Inc., 9 the plaintiffhad a well-established, common law remedy against
the defendant, yet the Court upheld the claim under the Rule.2 ° In two SEC
enforcement actions, SEC v. Edwards2 'and SECv. Zandford,22 the Court upheld
the Commission's use of the Rule by giving a liberal reading to two different
2 3 the
sections of the Exchange Act. Similarly, in United States v. O'Hagan,
2
4
Court upheld a criminal conviction under a broad reading of the Rule. With the
exception of the O'Hagan case, which has drawn a significant amount of

14. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,737 (1975) ("When we deal
with private actions under Rule 1Ob-5, we deal with ajudicial oak which has grown from little more
than a legislative acorn.").
15. 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
16. 463 U.S. 646, 655 (1983).
17. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 843 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that anyone
who trades on the basis of material, nonpublic information violates Rule 10b-5). But see Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 225 (purchasing securities based on nonpublic information does not violate Rule 1Ob-5
because the purchaser had no common law duty of disclosure to the sellers).
18. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 73 (1990) (holding that demand notes
issued by farmer's cooperative are securities); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
386-87 (1983) (finding a remedy available under Rule lob-5 despite availability of a remedy under
section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933).
19. 532 U.S. 588 (2001).
20. Id. at 595-97.
21. 540 U.S. 389, 397 (2004).
22. 535 U.S. 813, 825 (2002).
23. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
24. Id. at 667.
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scholarly comment,25 these decisions have gone largely unnoticed.
Scholars and other court observers who have postulated about the "new
federalism" in the Supreme Court-the notion that the Court has a new-found
respect for the role of state law in our federal system--would be well advised to
consider these securities laws cases. These cases signal a different judicial
philosophy. This philosophy is not only at odds with a few high-profile decisions
under the Commerce Clause26 and the Tenth Amendment," but it is also at odds
with earlier decisions of the Court in the area of securities law. Indeed, a cynic
might consider the new federalism cases to be an anomaly, with the reality being
that the Court is still as nationalistic in its approach as it traditionally has been.
If the securities laws cases discussed in this Article are any indication, the Court
is becoming even more nationalistic.28
This Article examines Supreme Court jurisprudence since 1997 under the
federal securities laws, particularly Rule lOb-5, in light of the Court's earlier
decisions and its recent decisions construing the Constitution and federal statutes
as they relate to the regulation of business. Part I considers the Court's earlier
decisions under the federal securities laws, which stand in contrast to the more
recent decisions (O'Hagan,Wharf,Zandford,and Edwards)discussed in Part II.
Part III then considers developments beyond the Supreme Court's Rule 1Ob-5
jurisprudence and places those developments in the context of the Court's
tendency to prefer national solutions to a wide variety of problems, thereby
directly or indirectly preempting state law. The cases in Part I present the
question of federal-state relations or the role of federalism on our legal
landscape. Although in general this topic does not beg for further scholarly

25. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent
Choice Between PropertyRights and Securities Fraud,52 SMU L. REv. 1589 (1999); Richard W.
Painter et al., Don 't Ask, Just Tell: Insider TradingAfter United States v. O'Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV.
153 (1998); A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O'Hagan: Agency Law and JusticePowell'sLegacy
for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REv. 13 (1998).

But see Randall W. Quinn, The
MisappropriationTheory of Insider Trading in the Supreme Court: A (Brief)Response to the

(Many) CriticsofUnited States v. O'Hagan, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 865 (2003) (supporting
the Court's holding but noting the scholarship critical of the Court).
26. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (holding unconstitutional the
Federal Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,551 (1995) (holding
unconstitutional the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990); see also infra notes 146-69.
27. See Printzv. United States, 521 U.S. 898,935 (1997) (holding that Congress lacked the
authority to "commandeer" state officials into implementing a federal regulatory program); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (same). But see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141,
149 (2000) (holding that no commandeering occurs ifCongress restricts the ability of state officials
to share a driver's personal information without consent).
28. See, e.g., ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (Oxford

University Press 2001). Viewing the new federalism cases in a broader context, Professor Nagel
concluded that: "[T]he record as a whole is mixed enough to cast doubt on the idea that devotion
to decentralized decision making is now an overriding value for most members of the Court." Id.
at 28.
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commentary,29 little note has been taken of the Court's work in the commercial
area or how the Court's decisions interpreting federal law have limited the
traditional role of the states.
I. THE COURT'S EARLIER DECISIONS

The Court's 1975 decision in Blue Chip Stamps was an indication that the
Court believed that Rule 1Ob-5 had to be cabined. That decision was a reaction
not only to the increase in securities litigation in the federal courts (which have
exclusive jurisdiction over securities fraud cases under Rule 1Ob-5),3" but also to
decisions of the Warren Court recognizing "implied rights of action" under
federal statutes. A prime example of this was the 1964 decision in J.L Case Co.
v. Borak,3 1 in which the Court recognized an implied right of action under section
14(a) of the Exchange Act, which regulates the solicitation of proxies in publicly
held companies.32 In Borak, the Court reasoned that a private right of action,
even though not provided for by Congress, would promote investor protection
and would serve as an important supplement to SEC enforcement actions;33
private plaintiffs would then serve as "private attorneys general. 34 The Warren
Court thus adopted an instrumental test for recognizing implied rights.3 5
The Burger Court rejected this judicial philosophy and announced, in Cort
v. Ash,36 a new standard for recognizing an implied right of action.37 Henceforth,
the plaintiff seeking recognition of an implied right would have to satisfy a fourpart test:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not
expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the

29. Dozens of articles on federalism are published annually. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REv. 7 (2001); Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism and
Functionalism in Federalism Analysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 959 (1997); Allison H. Eid,
Federalismand Formalism,11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1191 (2003); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
"Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's FederalismDecisions, 69 U. Ci. L. REV. 429
(2002); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalismand the Uses andLimits of Law: Printz andPrinciple?,111
HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998); Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism,47 VAND. L. REV. 1485
(1994); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a ConstitutionalArchitecturefor CooperativeFederalism, 79
N.C. L. REV. 663 (2001).
30. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000).
31. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
32. Id. at 432-34.
33. Id. at 432.
34. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 61 n.13 (1977) (noting the importance of
this concept in enforcing federal law); see Borak, 377 U.S. at 432.
35. The Court stated: "While [§ 14(a)] makes no specific reference to a private right of
action, among its chief purposes is 'the protection of investors,' which certainly implies the
availability ofjudicial relief where necessary to achieve that result." Borak, 377 U.S. at 432.
36. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
37. Id.at 78.
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plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted,"-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action
one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern
of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely on federal law?38
At issue in Cort was whether the plaintiff could maintain a derivative suit
alleging an implied right of action under a federal criminal statute that prohibited
corporations from making campaign contributions in Presidential elections.3 9
The plaintiff, a shareholder of Bethlehem Steel Corp., claimed that the president
of the corporation violated the federal statute and sought injunctive relief and
monetary damages. Applying its four-factor test, the Court concluded that the
plaintiff could not maintain a derivative action based on the statute.4 °
With regard to the fourth part of the test, which focuses on the role of state
law, the Court expressed several concerns. First, if the defendant's conduct
violates his fiduciary duties under state law, the claim should rest on that.4'
Second, just the opposite may be the case-state law may permit corporations to
contribute to state elections, in which case shareholders would be on notice that
corporate funds could be so employed and that there could be no federal
recovery. 42 Finally, and most importantly, the presence or lack of a state remedy
would have no effect on the realization of Congress's purpose in enacting the
statute in question.4 3 Congress was not concerned with regulating the internal
affairs of corporations, as it was when it regulated the solicitation of proxies, but
rather it sought to "dull[] [corporations'] impact upon federal elections." To
achieve this, it was not critical to recognize a private right of action for violation
of the statute, or, in the Court's words: "the existence or nonexistence of a
derivative cause of action for damages would not aid or hinder this primary
goal. 45
One can quibble with the Court's analysis. Surely the potential of a private
damage remedy would add a deterrent effect to corporate officers who otherwise
would be inclined to violate the statute. Logically, a private action would further
Congress's goal of dulling the corporate impact on federal elections. Even if
state law permitted corporate contributions to state elections, shareholders would
not be on notice that corporate funds could be expended for federal elections.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. (citations omitted).
18 U.S.C. § 610 (2000); Cort, 422 U.S. at 68.
Cort, 422 U.S. at 85.
Id. at 84.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Indeed, considering the federal criminal statute, shareholders could expect just
the opposite. In light of these factors, it appears that the Court was simply
reluctant to recognize an implied right of action and was backpedaling on Borak.
More importantly, in Cort,the Court was demonstrating a high sensitivity to
state law. Although an intentional violation of a criminal statute would constitute
a breach of fiduciary duty under state law,46 the plaintiff preferred to base its
claim on a federal statute to avoid having to post security for expenses. Perhaps
the Court merely wanted to avoid interfering with the state policy of regulating
derivative actions. If that is true, the Court was subordinating the importance of
federal election laws to this state policy,47 and demonstrating a sensitivity to state
law that contrasts sharply with its recent decisions.
In retrospect, Cort was only a weigh station on the route to the virtual demise
of implied private actions under federal statutes. In 1979, the Court refused to
find an implied right of action under the antifraud provision of the Investment
Advisors Act section 20648 or section 17(a) of the Exchange Act, which is also
an antifraud provision.49 In the case decided under the Investment Advisors Act,
the Court explained its evolved view on private rights of action:
The question whether a statute creates a cause of action, either expressly
or by implication, is basically a matter of statutory construction. While
some opinions of the Court have placed considerable emphasis upon the
desirability of implying private rights of action in order to provide
remedies thought to effectuate the purposes of a given statute, [citing] J.
1.Case Co. v. Borak, what must ultimately be determined is whether
Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted, as our recent
decisions have made clear. We accept this as the appropriate inquiry to
be made in resolving the issues presented by the case before us.5"
The implied right of action cases are a nice compliment to the restricted view
the Court took in Rule lOb-5 cases starting with Blue Chip Stamps. The Court
seemed to say in Blue Chip Stamps that although it could not recede from
recognizing a private action under Rule 1Ob-5, because a private right had been
long recognized by the federal courts, the right would have to be limited.5 Blue

46. See, e.g., Twenty First Century L.P.I v. LaBianca, 19 F. Supp. 2d 35, 40-44 (E.D.N.Y.
1998).
47. See Alison Grey Anderson, The Meaning of Federalism: Interpreting the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 70 VA. L. REV.813, 826 (1984).
48. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979); see 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80b-I to 80b-15 (2000).
49. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 573-74 (1979); see 15 U.S.C. § 78g
(2000).
50. Transamerica,444 U.S. at 15-16 (citations omitted).
51. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) ("This Court had no
occasion to deal with the subject until 25 years [after a district court recognized a private right of
action in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1945)], and at that time we
confirmed with virtually no discussion the overwhelming consensus of the District Courts and
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Chip Stamps fits nicely into this rubric. The Court based its decision on policy
considerations, primarily holding that recognizing a claim under these
circumstances would enhance the possibility of groundless and vexatious
litigation."
Two years after Blue Chip Stamps, the Court decided Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green, a case laden with potential significance. 3 In Santa Fe, the
plaintiffs, minority shareholders of Kirby Lumber Corp., sought to use Rule 1Ob5 to challenge a freeze-out merger engineered by Kirby's ninety-five percent
stockholder, Santa Fe. The plaintiffs complained that Santa Fe breached its
fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders by failing to pay a fair price for their
shares. Reversing the appellate court, the Supreme Court again limited the reach
of Rule l Ob-5 by holding that only manipulations and deceptions are within the
Rule's proscriptions." According to the Court, breaches of fiduciary duty not
involving a manipulation or deception are matters of state law, not federal law. 5
Santa Fe provided the Court with the opportunity to apply its recent decision
in Cort v. Ash. Focusing particularly on the effect on state law of recognizing a
private right of action under the Rule for breach of fiduciary duty, the Court
noted that such an "extension of the federal securities laws would overlap and
quite possibly interfere with state corporate law."56 The Court explained that
federal courts would have to craft a uniform rule of fiduciary duty that might
diverge from the law in some states. 7 In theory, conduct could violate this
federal fiduciary duty rule and not violate state fiduciary standards. However,
it is unclear why, from a policy perspective, this would be problematic. If certain
conduct constituted a breach of fiduciary duty under the federal rule but not the
state rule, the complaining shareholder would have a federal but not a state claim,
and vice versa, if the conduct violated state standards but not federal standards.
In the area of disclosure, a similar divergence exists; a misrepresentation may be
material for purposes of state law, but not federal. 8 The important point is not

Courts of Appeals that such a cause of action did exist.").
52. Id. at 740.
53. Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
54. Id. at 474.
55. Id. at 478-80.
56. Id. at 479.
57. Id.
58. For instance, the Delaware Supreme Court has announced a bright-line rule that merger
negotiations are not material until the parties have agreed on the price and structure of the
transaction. Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840,847 n.5 (Del. 1987). The federal rule
is that merger negotiations may be material at an earlier stage. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 249 (1988). But see Alessi v. Beracha, 849 A.2d 939, 946-50 (Del. Ch. 2004) (questioning
the rule in Bershadand holding that merger negotiations may become material at an earlier point).
If the Delaware Supreme Court affirms the lower court's decision in Alessi, state and federal law
would be consistent; however, several Delaware decisions since the Bershaddecisionhave followed
it. See, e.g., In re MONY Group Inc. S'holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9, 29 (Del. Ch. 2004); Krim v.
Pronet, Inc., 744 A.2d 523, 528-29 (Del. Ch. 1999); Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp.,
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whether the standards are different, but instead what is the effect of different
standards. In the area of fiduciary duties, different standards may mean that
fiduciaries have to be cognizant of, and conform to, the higher standard, be it
federal or state. This may be a good thing, at least from the perspective of
investors. Regardless of whether there would be real interference, the
significance of Santa Fe is that the Court respected the traditional sphere of state
law.
This approach was prominent in another 1977 decision, Piperv. Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc.,9 a case deciding whether an unsuccessful tender offeror had
standing under section 14(e) of the Exchange Act to bring an action alleging
fraud by the successful competitor and others. Section 14(e) of the Williams Act,
which is a federal statute adopted in 1968 to regulate tender offers, is similar in
structure and content to Rule lOb-5 ;61 on that basis alone, there was a rationale
for finding a private right of action. 6 Based on its review of the legislative
history of the Williams Act, and an application of the four-factor Cort test, the
Court concluded that the plaintiff did not have standing.6 2 With reference to the
relevance of state law, the Court approved the appellate court's conclusion that,
under common law principles, the plaintiff would have a cause of action for
interference with prospective economic advantage.63 The presence of this state
law remedy helped persuade the Court not to recognize a federal remedy under
the Williams Act.'
State law continued to be a consideration for the Court in several prominent
cases related to the federal securities laws. In Burks v. Lasker,65 the Court

559 A.2d 257, 275 (Del. Ch. 1989).
59. 430 U.S. 1, 54 (1977).
60. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(e), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e), provides:
(e) Untrue statement of material fact or omission of fact with respect to tender offer
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or
omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in
any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders
in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. The Commission
shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2000). See generallyMark J. Loewenstein, Section 14(e) of the Williams Act
andthe Rule IOb-5 Comparisons,71 GEO. L.J. 1311 (1983) (explaining why 14(e) might be more
broadly construed than Rule 1Ob-5).
61. Piper,430 U.S. at 41.
62. Id. at 42 n.28.
63. Id. at 16.
64. Id. at 41, 42.
65. 441 U.S. 471, 486 (1979) (alleging violations of the Investment Company Act and the
Investment Advisors Act).
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decided that the trial court should look to state law to determine whether a
committee appointed by the board of directors of a federally regulated investment
company had the authority to terminate a shareholder's derivative action alleging
violations of the federal securities laws by the directors. Also, in CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp.,66 the Court upheld a state law limiting the ability of a tender
offeror to consummate an offer over objections that the state statute was (1)
inconsistent with the Williams Act and thus preempted by it, and (2) ran afoul of
the Commerce Clause, because it interfered with interstate offers for securities."
In the course of its opinion, the Court noted the role of state law:
It thus is an accepted part of the business landscape in this country for
States to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the
rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares. A State has an
interest in promoting stable relationships among parties involved in the
corporations it charters, as well as in ensuring that investors in such
corporations have an effective voice in corporate affairs.6"
By 1994, however, this sensitivity to the relationship between state and
federal law was remarkably absent from an opinion that sharply limited Rule
1Ob-5.69 In its controversial Central Bank decision, the Court held that neither
the language of section 10(b) nor the general structure of the federal securities
laws supported the recognition of a claim under Rule 1Ob-5 for civil liability
against alleged aiders and abettors of primary violators."0 Central Bank was

66. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
67. Id. at 94.
68. Id. at 91.
69. The shift in the Court's securities laws jurisprudence may simply be explained by the
retirement of Justice Powell after the 1986-87 term. Justice Powell had an interest and expertise
in business law that he brought to bear as a member of the Court. He had a profound influence on
the Court during his tenure, authoring several key decisions. With his departure, the Court took
fewer securities laws cases and seemed to do an inferiorjob in deciding them. Professor Pritchard's
excellent article details this history. A. C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the
Counterrevolutionin the FederalSecurities Laws, 52 DuKE L.J. 841 (2003). He concludes:
Since Powell's retirement, the Court's forays into [the federal securities laws] have been
occasionally impenetrable and sometimes bizarre. On other occasions the Court simply
regurgitates the party line offered by the SEC. Overall, "scholars and learned
practitioners are giving the Court's securities law opinions low grades for logic, clarity,
and usefulness in future cases."
Id. at 949 (quoting Donald C. Langevoort, Wordsfrom on High About Rule lOb-5: Chiarella 's
History, Central Bank's Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 868 (1995) (citations omitted)). In this
Article, I seek to sort out this chaos with an explanation that harmonizes the Court's securities laws
opinions with its broader tendency to prefer national solutions to problems. Justice Powell resisted
this tendency, making securities laws decisions during his tenure somewhat distinctive from the rest
of the Court's jurisprudence.
70. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A.v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,19192 (1994).
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decided against a long history of recognition of aider and abettor liability; all
eleven U.S. Courts of Appeals that considered the issue upheld a private cause
of action against aiders and abettors. 7 Indeed, as Justice Stevens noted in his
dissent, the petitioner in this case "assumed the existence of a right of action
against aiders and abettors, and sought review only of the subsidiary questions."7 2
The Court, sua sponte, asked the parties to address the issue.73 CentralBank thus
represents a Court actively seeking to limit the contours of the Rule without
concern for the interrelationship of federal and state law.
In fact, the securities laws of some states include provisions allowing for
aider and abettor liability.74 The denial of a federal claim raises the importance
of state law in this area in the same way that denial of a claim under Santa Fe
did, yet the Central Bank Court did not cite that as a justification for its
holding.7" This oversight raises doubt whether the concern about state law
expressed in Santa Fe was genuine. Indeed, as noted above, the Court's
expressed concern in Santa Fe is difficult to assess on its own terms. Perhaps,
recognizing the vacuity of such a concern, the Court abandoned all reference to
it in CentralBank. In any case, the absence of an expressed state law concern,
even in the context of a limitation on Rule 1Ob-5, is consistent with the approach
taken in the modern cases, as explained in the next section.76
II. A NEW APPROACH?: THE O 'HA GAN, WHARF, ZANDFORD,
AND EDWARDS CASES

A. O'Hagan
O'Hagan, the first decision in a quartet of cases, answered a significant
71. Id.at 192-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 194.
73. Id. at 194-95.
74. See, e.g., Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Giacomi, 699 A.2d 101, 117 (Conn. 1997) (recognizing
aider and abettor liability under Connecticut law).
75. CentralBank, 511 U.S. at 191-92.
76. The notion that federalism is merely a mask for policy preference and not a real concern
in securities law cases was the focus of an article written some twenty years ago by Professor
Anderson. Anderson, supra note 47, at 856. She concluded that the Court's federalism concerns
were less than sincere:
In the corporate and securities area, the rhetoric of federalism should not be allowed to
confuse and obscure discussion of the major substantive policy choices that usually lie
behind the invocation of state interests, including questions concerning the appropriate
balance of managerial autonomy and shareholder protection, the proper role of
individual litigation in corporate governance, the benefits and evils of insider trading,
and the social value of contested takeovers. Although these issues all involve difficult
empirical questions and controversial value choices that are unlikely to be readily
resolved, eliminating the vocabulary of federalism from the discussion will at least clear
the air.
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question in the world of insider trading-whether one who is not himself an
insider but who misappropriates inside information and trades on that
information violates Rule 1Ob-5? 7 James O'Hagan was a partner in Dorsey &
Whitney, a law firm that represented Grand Metropolitan PLC, a U.K. company
that planned to make a hostile tender offer for the Pillsbury Company. Knowing
of the plans of his firm's client, and expecting a quick, risk-free profit, O'Hagan
purchased shares and call options of Pillsbury over the stock exchange and sold
those securities at a large profit when Grand Metropolitan's offer was made
public.78 He thus "misappropriated," for his own use, the confidential plans of
his client. The government charged that this misappropriation was a violation of
section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5. Because section 10(b) limits federal jurisdiction
to manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances used in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security, the government had to demonstrate how
O'Hagan's misappropriation satisfied thejurisdictional requirement.79 O'Hagan,
the misappropriator of inside information, may have "deceived" his client" and
purchased securities; however, are the two sufficiently linked? That is, in the
parlance of section 10(b), was the deception "in connection with" the purchase
or sale of a security?8 l In O'Hagan, the Court concluded that they were
sufficiently linked, pushing the "in connection with" requirement to its outer
limit, or perhaps beyond.82
To reach its conclusion, the Court sought support in the language of section
10(b): "[The section], as written, does not confine its coverage to deception of
a purchaser or seller of securities; rather, the statute reaches any deceptive device
used 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."'83 This is true
enough, but it begs the question of whether there is a sufficient nexus between
the deception and the securities transaction. If a person's deception causes
another to entrust her with a valuable piece of art which she then sells, using the
proceeds to purchase corporate stock, there is a deception and a securities
transaction, but is there a violation of section 10(b)? No court or commentator

77. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). This issue first came before the Supreme
Court in Chiarellav. UnitedStates, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), as an alternative basis for upholding the
defendant's conviction on charges of insider trading. A majority of the Court, however, decided
that the issue had not been raised below and therefore was not properly before the Court. Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 236-37.
78. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647-48.
79. Id. at 650-51.
80. The deception arises because the misappropriator does not disclose to the source that he
or she intends to trade on the information. Thus, if the misappropriator discloses his intentions,
there is no deception and no violation of section 10(b) (or Rule 1Ob-5). However, this use of the
term "deception" is a bit unusual because the source of the information was not "deceived" into
taking any action, a typical element in the tort of deception. The problem is more acute if the
misapropriator forms his intention after acquiring the information.
81. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653.
82. Id. at 656.
83. Id. at 651 (citation omitted).
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has ever suggested that a violation exists in such a situation. 4
Perhaps mindful of this slippery slope, the Court grounded its decision on a
policy basis, opining that the misappropriation theory is "well tuned to an
animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure honest securities markets and
thereby promote investor confidence. 8 5 This policy-based argument drew a
vigorous dissent from Justice Thomas (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist), who
wrote:
[R]epeated reliance on such broad-sweeping legislative purposes reaches
too far and is misleading in the context of the misappropriation theory.
It reaches too far in that, regardless of the overarching purpose of the
securities laws, it is not illegal to run afoul of the "purpose" of a statute,
only its letter. The majority's approach is misleading in this case
because it glosses over the fact that the supposed threat to fair and honest
markets, investor confidence, and market integrity comes not from the
supposed fraud in this case, but from the mere fact that the information
used by O'Hagan was nonpublic.8 6
Justice Thomas might have added that the majority opinion lacked any empirical
basis for its assertions on investor confidence and market integrity. Even under
the majority's view, O'Hagan could have traded if he made disclosure to his
client; such disclosure would have eliminated the "deception." However, trading
of this nature would still leave other traders in the market at an informational
disadvantage, as they often are. Apparently, neither this sort of informational

84. The Court cited with approval the Commission's use of a similar illustration to establish
the boundaries of the misappropriation theory:
In such a case, the Government states, "the proceeds would have value to the malefactor
apart from their use in a securities transaction, and the fraud would be complete as soon
as the money was obtained." In other words, money can buy, if not anything, then at
least many things; its misappropriation may thus be viewed as sufficiently detached
from a subsequent securities transaction that § 10(b)'s "in connection with" requirement
would not be met.
Id. at 656-57 (citations omitted). The problem is the phrase's vagueness. As Professor Ribstein
has pointed out: "With respect to insider trading, ['in connection with'] can range from requiring
privity between the plaintiff and defendant, as the Eighth Circuit held in O'Hagan,to requiring only
some effect on securities markets, as the Supreme Court held." Larry E. Ribstein, Federalismand
Insider Trading,6 SuP. CT.ECON. REV. 123, 142 (1998).
85. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658. The Court further explained:
Although informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors likely
would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading based on
misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law. An investor's
informational disadvantage vis-A-vis a misappropriator with material, nonpublic
information stems from contrivance, not luck; it is a disadvantage that cannot be
overcome with research or skill.
Id. at 658-59.
86. Id. at 689 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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disadvantage, nor other kinds of informational disadvantages, has destroyed
investor confidence. In any case, if the purpose of the federal securities laws is
to protect investors, it is unclear how a ban on insider trading achieves that. s7 In
addition, if the purpose of the law is to enhance pricing accuracy, a ban on
insider trading works in the opposite direction because insider trading either has
no effect on prices or, more likely, has a signaling effect that moves the market
in the right direction." Finally, and most importantly, the Court departed from
what Congress apparently sought to achieve with section 10(b). 9 There is no
support for the idea that Congress sought to address insider trading in section
10(b), having expressly dealt with that issue in § 16(b) of the Exchange Act.9"
Although there are various arguments to ban or limit insider trading,9' the
issue in O 'Haganwas whether the Court should stray from an analysis based on
text and legislative history to implement what it perceived as sound public policy.
In an apparent departure from its earlier precedents, as discussed above, the
Court demonstrated a willingness to move beyond the text of section 10(b).
What is missing from the Court's decision is any consideration of whether
O'Hagan's conduct is better addressed by state law. At most, O'Hagan's offense
was using information of his firm's client for his personal enrichment, thereby
committing a gross breach of fiduciary duty. Such conduct may well violate state

87. See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 93-110 (1966)
(challenging the then prevailing notion that insider trading should be banned as harmful to
investors); Jonathan R. Macey, Securities Trading: A ContractualPerspective,50 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 269, 273 ("[A]s long as the insider trading did not cause the trading by the outsider-that
is, as long as the outsider would have traded anyway-then insider trading may be seen as
beneficial, at least to the shareholders who are selling while the insiders are buying and those
buying while the insiders are selling."). But see WILuAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG,
INSIDER TRADING 41-117 (1996) (identifying potential harms to individual investors from insider
trading).
88. See Marcel Kahan, SecuritiesLaws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate"Stock Prices,
41 DUKE L.J. 977 (1992) (analyzing the benefits from repealing insider trading limitations);
Ribstein, supranote 84, at 127-28 (reviewing the arguments against restrictions on insider trading).
89. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir. 1943) (suggesting that
Congress addressed insider trading through section 16(b), a strict liability prophylactic rule). When
the SEC adopted Rule 1Ob-5, it did not indicate that it was intended to address insider trading. See
7 Fed. Reg. 3804 (1942); see also Conference on Codificationof FederalSecuritiesLaws, 22 Bus.
LAw. 793, 921-23 (1967) (explaining that the rule was originally drafted to address market
manipulation). But see Quinn, supranote 25, at 865 (arguing that O'Haganwas correctly decided).
See generally Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of InsiderTradingRestrictions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1,
55-69 (1980); Painter et al., supra note 25, at 160 n.29 (describing scholarship on the purpose of
section 10(b)); Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section I 0(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 425-61 (1990).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000).
91. See generally WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 87, at 29-39 (discussing whether insider
trading harms securities markets, the issuer, or the trader's employer).
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criminal law,92 but, in any event, it is a stretch to conclude that this is the sort of
conduct that Congress had in mind when it adopted section 10(b). The Court is
correct that Congress sought to protect investors through the federal securities
laws, but the O 'Hagandecision addresses breach of fiduciary duty, the sort of
conduct that Santa Fe held was not covered by section 10(b). 93 As noted above,
in Santa Fe, the directors breached their fiduciary duty to the shareholders,
enabling them to purchase shares at an unfair price.94 So framed, O'Hagan is
difficult to distinguish.
B. Zandford
Like O'Hagan,Zandfordraised the "in connection with" test in the context
of an SEC enforcement action against a stockbroker who stole money from his
clients: an elderly man in poor health and his mentally retarded daughter.95
Zandford, who had discretion to manage his clients' account, sold securities in
the account and transferred the proceeds to himself. After his criminal
conviction for mail fraud, the SEC brought this enforcement action, claiming a
violation of section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5. The district court entered summary
judgment against Zandford, but the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed, holding that there was not a sufficient connection between Zandford's
theft and a securities transaction: "Here, Zandford's securities sales were
incidental to his scheme to defraud. Zandford's fraud lay in absconding with the
proceeds of the sales. The record contains no suggestion that the sales
themselves were conducted in anything other than a routine and customary
fashion. 96 The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, relying, in part, on
its decision in O'Hagan.97
Key to the Court's decision was the principle that there need not "be a
misrepresentation about the value of a particular security in order to run afoul of
the [Securities Exchange] Act."98 Additionally, although one of the purposes of
the Act was to preserve "the integrity of the securities markets," 99 section 10(b)
covers deceptions involving securities transactions that are conducted face to
face as well as in organized markets.'00 Thus, the only question was whether the
admitted "fraud coincided with the sales" of the securities.' That occurred here
because the respondent's scheme, formed shortly after the account was opened,
was to misappropriate the proceeds of securities sales. The Court observed that
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
(1971)).
100.
101.

E.g., People v. Napolitano, 724 N.Y.S.2d 702, 708 (App. Div. 2001).
Sante Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-76 (1977).
Id. at 466-67.
SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 815 (2002).
SEC v. Zandford, 238 F.3d 559, 564 (4th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
Zandford, 535 U.S. at 825.
Id. at 820.
Id. at 821 (quoting Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 9
Id. at 822.
Id. at 820.
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the actual misappropriation was not a necessary element of the claim. 2
The Court's decision is eminently defensible and supported by its own
precedents. 0 3 Yet, like O'Hagan,one wishes for more. The case recognizes an
implied cause of action for what is essentially a breach of fiduciary duty and,
unlike O 'Hagan,that breach of fiduciary duty does not even remotely threaten
the integrity of the securities markets or investor confidence. To the extent that
the respondent's conduct adversely affects the markets because unsophisticated
investors might be deterred from participating, it is important to bear in mind that
Zandford was criminally convicted of federal wire fraud and was sentenced to
fifty-two months in prison. "° If the federal wire fraud statute, state criminal law,
discipline by the National Association of Securities Dealers, 10 5 actions by state
securities administrators, 106 and private damage actions, not to mention summary
dismissal from employment and lifetime banishment from the securities industry,
do not provide deterrence to this conduct, it is unlikely that an SEC enforcement
action under Rule 1Ob-5 would. In short, a remedy was not needed under the
Exchange Act to address the evils inherent in Zandford's conduct, nor was a
remedy needed to realize the purposes of the Act. The limitations expressed in
Santa Fe do not surface in the Court's opinion. Instead, the more expansive
decision in O'Haganis the guiding light of the opinion. Consequently, conduct
arguably beyond the reach of section 10(b) is now squarely within it.
C. Wharf
Of the four Supreme Court cases considered here, only Wharf involved a
private damage action under the securities laws. °7 In Wharf,the plaintiff had an
oral contract with the defendant, which, under certain circumstances, entitled the
plaintiff to purchase a ten percent interest in a business of the defendant's. When
the plaintiff sought to exercise its contractual rights, the defendant refused to
perform. The plaintiff brought an action under the federal securities laws,
claiming that it had purchased an option from the defendant and that the
defendant had acted fraudulently in failing to disclose that it had intended not to
honor plaintiffs rights under the option.' °s Affirming the lower court, the
Supreme Court held that an oral option is enforceable and that defendant's
102. Id. at 822.
103. Id. at 819; Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 6. The Court also indicated that it would defer to
the SEC under the principle of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984), and found that section 10(b) was ambiguous and that the SEC's interpretation was
reasonable.
104. Zandford,535 U.S. at 816.
105. See Brief ofNASD Regulation, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 15, SEC
v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2001) (No. 01-147), 2001 WL 1663774 ("[I]t is undoubtedly true that
NASD Regulation would have authority to bring disciplinary proceedings against [Zandford] for
misappropriating his client's assets .... ").
106. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CoRPs. & Ass'NS § 11-417 (West 2003).
107. Wharf(Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int'l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588 (2001).
108. Id. at 590.
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"secret reservation" amounted to an actionable misrepresentation.109
As in the other cases discussed here, the result in Wharf is defensible.
Technically, the plaintiff's contractual right to purchase a ten percent interest in
the defendant could be characterized as an option, and, clearly, an option is
included within the definition of a security.1 0 Less clear is the Court's
conclusion that the "secret reservation" amounted to fraud."' One might
question whether the defendant had a duty, under the federal securities laws, to
disclose its intentions to the plaintiff, with whom it was dealing at arm's length.
In other circumstances, the Court has said that a person does not commit
securities fraud by failing to disclose material, nonpublic information unless he
or she has an independent duty to the other party to the transaction to make the
disclosure. 2 In other words, mere possession of "inside information" is
insufficient to trigger a disclosure obligation. Without citing this line of
decisions, the Court supported its conclusion with a reference to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts: "Since a promise necessarily carries with it the implied
assertion of an intention to perform[,] it follows that a promise made without
such an intention is fraudulent.""1 3
What is missing from the Wharf opinion is a consideration of the broader
issue of whether this sort of transaction ought to be covered by the federal
securities laws. It is not as though the Court had no choice but to recognize
federal jurisdiction in this case. The definition of "security" is prefaced by the
phrase "unless the context otherwise requires," ' 4 and this case is one in which
the Court might have considered the context. In Marine Bank v. Weaver,' '" for
instance, the Court held that neither a certificate of deposit issued to the plaintiff
by a federally insured bank nor a profit sharing arrangement entered into between
the bank's borrower and the plaintiff were securities because, in each instance,
the context suggested otherwise." 6 As to the certificate of deposit, the Court
rej ected the lower court conclusion that the certificate was indistinguishable from
other long-term debt obligations by noting that unlike other long-term debt, a
certificate of deposit issued by a federally regulated bank was "virtually
guaranteed" by the FDIC. 1 ' The "abundant" protection that accrues to bank
certificate holders makes it "unnecessary to subject issuers [of the certificates]
to liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.""'8
As to the profit sharing arrangement, which entitled the plaintiff to a share

109. Id.at 596.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2000).
111. Warf,532 U.S. at 597.
112. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980).
113. Wharf,532 U.S. at 596 (quoting RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS § 530, cmt. c (1976))
(alteration in original).
114. 15 U.S.C. §77b(a) (2000).
115. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
116. Id. at 560-61.
117. Id.at558.
118. Id. at 559.
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of the borrower's profits, plus a fixed sum each month and certain other
benefits," 9 the Court relied on the unique and private nature of the agreement:
"[T]he [borrowers] distributed no prospectus to the [plaintiffs] or to other
potential investors, and the unique agreement they negotiated was not designed
to be traded publicly."'2 0 This, of course, describes the arrangement in Wharfas
well. While Marine Bank may be an easier case than Wharf for denying the
applicability of the federal securities laws, it at least compels a consideration of
a context exception. The oral contract in Wharfmay not, in the words of Marine
Bank, be "commonly considered to be securities in the commercial world,"' 1 and
it was not offered to other investors. Most importantly, the defendant's default
in Wharfappears to be indistinguishable from a garden-variety breach of contract
or, possibly, the common law tort of deceit. A Court sensitive to issues of
federalism would at least have explored the ramifications of its decision in this
light. Instead, a simple state law cause of action is now within the federal
securities laws.
D. Edwards
Like Wharf, Edwards is a case that received short shrift in the Supreme
Court, and undeservedly so. Edwards involved a payphone leasing business. 22
The defendant, through independent distributors, sold payphones to investors and
offered them a site lease, a five-year leaseback and management agreement, and
a buyback agreement. The investors received a fixed return under the leaseback
agreement, amounting to fourteen percent of the purchase price. The
arrangement had the trappings of many other investments,' 3 and the Court had
little trouble finding that the investors had purchased a type of security known
as an investment contract. 4 Thus, the district court had jurisdiction under the
federal securities laws to adjudicate the SEC's petition for an injunction. 5
The case centered on the Court's venerable decision in SEC v. WJ. Howey
Co.,16 where the Court stated that an investment contract consists of: "an
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the
119. Subject to the borrower's discretion, the plaintiffs could use the barn and pasture held by
the borrower's corporation, and the plaintiffs had the right to veto future borrowing by the
corporation. Id. at 560.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 559.
122. SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004).
123. See, e.g., Wash. Square Sec., Inc. v. Aune, 385 F.3d 432 (4th Cir. 2004); In re Alpha
Telecom, Inc., No. CV01-1283-PA, 2004 WL 3142555 (D. Or. Aug. 18,2004); Homor, Townsend
& Kent, Inc. v. Hamilton, No. CIV.A.1:02-CV-2979J, 2003 WL 23832424 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 29,
2003); Leroy v. Paytel III Mgmt. Ass'n, Inc., No. 91-CIV- 1933, 1992 WL 367090 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
24,1992); State exrel. Millerv. Pace, 677 N.W.2d 761 (Iowa2004); State v. Justin, 779 N.Y.S.2d
717 (Sup. Ct. 2003).
124. Edwards, 540 U.S. at 397.
125. Id.
126. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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efforts of others.' ' 127 The Eleventh Circuit had concluded that this scheme was
not an investment contract because the investors were not looking to the
business's profits for a return; rather, they were promised a fixed rate of return.12
Moreover, that court ruled, because the investors were promised a fixed return,
they were not dependent on anyone's efforts:
[T]he determining factor is the fact that the investors were entitled to
their lease payments under their contracts with ETS. Because their
returns were contractually guaranteed, those returns were not derived
from the efforts of Edwards or anyone else at ETS; rather, they were
29
derived as the benefit of the investors' bargain under the contract. 1
The Eleventh Circuit's decision was highly questionable. It narrowly read
the Supreme Court's earlier decision in United Housing Foundation,Inc. v.
Forman,130 where in referring to the "profit" test of Howey, the Court had
suggested that profits meant capital appreciation or earnings.' 31 It would be
nonsensical to so limit the concept of an "investment contract" and the Supreme
Court correctly reversed the appellate court on that issue. But what makes
Edwards worthy of comment is that the Court did not discuss the second element
of Howey-the requirement that there be a common enterprise.132 Here,
apparently, each investor entered into separate contracts with Edwards's
companies. The invested funds were apparently not pooled into a common
fund.' 3 Rather, there was only what some courts have referred to as "vertical
commonality"'34 : each investor's success was dependent on the success or, at
least the efforts, of the promoter.135 The problem with concluding that vertical

127. Id at 301.
128. SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 300 F.3d 1281, 1284-85 (11 th Cir. 2002), rev'dsub nom.
SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004).
129. Id.at 1285.
130. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
131. Id. at 852.
132. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301.
133. Judge Lay, concurring in the appellate court decision, observed the lack of pooling of
funds. ETSPayphones, 300 F.3d at 1287 (Lay, J., concurring) ("In the present case, there was no
pooling of money in a common venture....").
134. For a note on the meaning of commonality, see Rodney L. Moore, Note, Defining an
"Investment Contract": The Commonality Requirement of the Howey Test, 43 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1057 (1986).
135. Steinberg summarizes two views of vertical commonality, succinctly set forth in
Mechigian v. Art Capital Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1421, 1425-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1985):
There is a split in the courts that have applied the "vertical commonality" approach
regarding precisely what is necessary to satisfy this standard. The courts applying the
more restrictive definition state that "vertical commonality" exists where "the fortunes
of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those
seeking the investment or of third parties." SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,
474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). Thus, the Ninth

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:17

commonality is sufficient is that it reads the second prong out of the Howey test;
vertical commonality simply means the investor's fortunes were somehow
dependent on the efforts (or, in some jurisdictions, the fortunes) of the promoter.
This dependency is, of course, inevitable in virtually any investment and, in any
event, is the third prong of the Howey test. Moreover, the requirement of
horizontal commonality links the definition of a security to the investor's
participation in broader capital markets-the focus of the federal securities
laws.' 36
The question of whether vertical commonality is sufficient to satisfy the
Howey test has divided the circuits,'3 7 and prompted Justice White to urge the
granting of certiorari in a 1985 case.' Moreover, the Court's 1982 decision in
Marine Bank v. Weaver' has been read as implying that only horizontal
commonality will satisfy the definition of a security. 4 ' With that background,
and given the facts of Edwards, it is surprising that the Court did not address the
commonality issue. What can be made of this? One answer is that the Court was
implicitly deciding that, despite Marine Bank, vertical commonality is sufficient
to satisfy the definition. Another possibility is that the Court was removing the
commonality test in its entirety; a security is then defined as an investment of
money with the expectation of an investment return (in the form of a share of the

Circuit appears to require merely that there be a "direct relation between the success or
failure of the promoter and that of his investors." Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815,
817 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,469 U.S. 1115 (1985). However, absent such a direct
relation, the Ninth Circuit will not find "vertical commonality."
A broader definition of "vertical commonality" seems to have been articulated by the
Fifth Circuit which has held that "the requisite commonality is evidenced by the fact that
the fortunes of all investors are inextricably tied to the efficacy of the [promoter's
efforts]." SECv. Continental Commodities, 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir.1974)). Thus, rather
than requiring a tie between the fortunes of the investors and the fortunes of the
promoters, as is necessitated under the restrictive definition of "vertical commonality,"
the broader definition merely requires a link between the fortunes of the investors and
the efforts of the promoters. Judge Robert J. Ward of this court has noted that the
application of this broader definition of "vertical commonality" essentially eliminates
the "common enterprise" prong of the Howey test because the only inquiry required is
whether the success or failure of the investment is dependent upon the promoter's
efforts-i.e. the third prong of the Howey test. Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 507
F. Supp. 1225, 1237-38 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 42-43 (4th ed. 2004) (citations altered). See
generally id. and authorities cited therein.
136. ETSPayphones, 300 F.3d at 1287 (Lay, J., concurring).
137. See STEINBERG, supra note 135.
138. Mordaunt v. Incomco, 469 U.S. 1115, 1116 (1985) (White, J., dissenting).
139. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
140. STEINBERG, supra note 135, at 76-77.
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profits, capital appreciation, or a fixed return) as a result of the efforts of others.
Both explanations are troubling, however, in view of the careful analysis given
by the Court in previous cases raising the definition of a security.' 4 ' Clearly,
though, the Court was unwilling to define away the SEC's power to bring an
enforcement action under these facts. This is understandable considering that,
according to the Commission's complaint, more than $300 million was raised
from over 10,000 investors.' 4 2 This fraud (if it was one)'43 had national
implications and, perhaps, was sufficient to invoke the protections of the federal
securities laws. On the other hand, the Court has previously noted that the
federal securities laws were not intended to address all frauds"-only those
involving securities. While the definition of a security is broad, it is not without
boundaries, and the Court's decision in Edwards failed to consider one of those
important boundaries. There is a certain judicial arrogance in this; the fine
distinctions made in earlier cases have been rendered unimportant, unworthy of
even a passing mention. The decision can thus be characterized as one preferring
a national solution-in this case under the securities laws-to alternative
approaches.

m.FEDERALISM AND CORPORATE LAW
In each of these cases, the Court elected an expansive view of the federal
securities laws that threatens displacement of state law.'4 5 There has been no

141. In addition to Howey and Edwards, the Court has decided numerous cases over the years
regarding the definition of a "security." E.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 58 (1990)
(finding short term notes to be securities); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 697
(1985) (rejecting the "sale of business" doctrine); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555
(1982) (finding that neither bank certificate of deposit nor unique profit sharing arrangements are
securities); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 570 (1979) (holding interest in
noncontributory pension plan is not a security); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
860 (1975) (deciding stock in a housing cooperative is not a security); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 349 (1943) (finding that oil leases, as structured, were investment contracts).
142. SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 391 (2004).
143. There was no indication in either of the published opinions that Edwards was running a
scam. It could well have been the case, as Judge Lay noted in his concurring opinion in the court
of appeals, that "ETS made a good faith effort to run a legitimate business." SEC v. ETS
Payphones, Inc., 300 F.3d 1281, 1288 (1 lth Cir. 2002), rev'dsub nom. SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S.
389 (2004).
144. See, e.g., Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 556 ("[W]e are satisfied that Congress, in enacting
the securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud.").
145. An expansive view of federal legislation in general, as discussed in this section, has an
analog in the Court's interpretation of individual liberties, guaranteed by the Constitution, against
attempts by the states to further competing interests. For instance, in R.A. V. v. City ofSt. Paul,505
U.S. 377 (1992), the Court's interpretation of freedom of speech invalidated the state's attempt to
regulate the use of "fighting words," which had been regarded as a form of unprotected speech. Id.
at 381. For a discussion of several recent cases demonstrating the same tendency, noting
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concern that these cases represent a rejection of federalism, despite the
contemporaneous decisions in United States v. Lopez,'46 which held
unconstitutional the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, and United States v.
Morrison,4 7 which held unconstitutional the Federal Violence Against Women
Act. Each ofthese cases suggested a profound commitment to federalism. Lopez
and Morrison raised the question as to whether there were limits to Congress's
power when acting under the Commerce Clause; the Court said that there were.
In the securities laws cases considered here, there is no question that Congress
has the power to regulate securities transactions occurring in interstate
commerce; rather, the issue is how its legislation should be interpreted. 4 '
The Court has, in the past, demonstrated a sensitivity to expansive readings
of federal legislation, observing "[t]hat an activity is of local character may help
in a doubtful case to determine whether Congress intended to reach it."' 4 9 This
5 ° reflects a judicial
dictum from its 1942 decision in Wickard v. Filburn"
sentiment absent from the Rule 1Ob-5 cases considered here; the Wickard dictum
suggests that if Congress intended to regulate a local activity it would do so
unambiguously.' 5' Can it be said that section 10(b) clearly indicates an intention
to reach the breach of fiduciary duty in O'Hagan,the misappropriation of client
funds in Zandford,the breach of contract in Wharf,or, with respect to Edwards,
that the definition of a security includes the contractual arrangements present
there?
The dictum in Wickard seems not to have had a great deal of influence in
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Wickard is itself an example of an expansive
reading of a federal statute; the Court interpreted the Agricultural Adjustment
Act to limit the ability of a farmer to grow wheat for personal consumption.'

particularly how the Court's most conservative Justices prefer national interests to state interests,
see NAGEL, supranote 28, at 27.
146. 514 U.S. 549, 602 (1995) (holding Congress does not have power under the Commerce
Clause to regulate firearm possession in local schools).
147. 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
148. One could be so bold as to raise the question of whether, at least in Zandford, interstate
commerce was involved. The case seems local if one views it as a simple theft of money by a
Maryland broker from a Maryland brokerage account owned by Maryland residents. Interstate
commerce enters into the case because the securities were sold on a national securities exchange
and the funds were transferred between New York and Maryland. These facts, of course, were
tangential to the theft in question, but sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional elements of the
Exchange Act. Whether these jurisdictional elements were satisfied was not an issue in the case.
149. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942).
150. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349,351 (1941) ("But bearing in mind
that in ascertaining the scope of congressional legislation a due regard for a proper adjustment of
the local and national interests in our federal scheme must always be in the background, we ought
not to find in § 5 radiations beyond the obvious meaning of language unless otherwise the purpose
of the Act would be defeated.").
151. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124.
152. See Jim Chen, Filburn'sLegacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719, 1747 (2003) (suggesting that, in
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In Wickard, however, it may have been the case that Congress intended to reach
this activity because, in the aggregate, the production of wheat by farmers for
personal consumption could have a substantial economic effect on the market for
wheat, the object of the legislation.153 By contrast, the Exchange Act was
concerned with the national market for securities; the oral "option contract"
between the parties in the Wharfcase had at best only a tenuous relationship to
that market. The constitutionality of applying the Exchange Act to the facts of
Wharfwas not even an issue in the case.
An expansive reading of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause is
a consistent theme, until perhaps recently, of the Court's post-New Deal
jurisprudence. The Court upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited
racial discrimination in certain places of public accommodation, as a valid
exercise of Congress's power, over challenges that the regulated activity was not
interstate commerce. 5 4 In HeartofAtlanta Motel,"5 5 for instance, the Court held
that the renting of motel rooms was commerce that concerns more than one state
and thus prohibiting racial discrimination in the renting of rooms was within
Congress's power.'56
While the Civil Rights Act was intended to reach racial discrimination in
such places, other cases reflected the Court's willingness to interpret federal
legislation to reach activities that were likely not the intent of congressional
legislation. A typical case was Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,'57 in which the
Court held that the Sherman Act reached the actions of a state bar that published
a fee schedule that operated as price floor on legal fees. Goldfarb and other
cases"' have suggested to many commentators that Congress's power under the

view of the Court's modem federalism cases, Filburnmay represent a high water mark under the
Commerce Clause).
153. One might explain Wickard as the Court's concession to practical necessity. To assure
the success of its attempt to regulate the market for wheat, Congress had to regulate all production.
See Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism,46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 643, 651 (1996) ("In
[ Wickard v. Filburn],the practical necessities of administering a national program were a reason
for devaluing the proposition that there is some regulatory authority that is beyond the power of
Congress.").
154. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 278 (1964).
155. Id. C.f Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
406 (2004) (finding that section 2 of the Sherman Act did not reach Verizon's refusal to enter into
contracts with competitors, as required by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, in part because the
Telecommunications Act provided that nothing in it "shall be construed to modify, impair, or
supersede the applicability of any of the antitrust laws." (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2000)).
156. HeartofAtlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 278. See also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
305 (1964), a companion case to HeartofAtlanta Motel, which upheld the applicability of the Act
to restaurants.
157. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
158. E.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156-67 (1971) (upholding the constitutionality
of the federal anti-loansharking statute to a private, intrastate loan). As in the civil rights cases, this
case involved the finding of constitutionality of a federal statute to a situation to which it was
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Commerce Clause was virtually limitless' 59 until several recent cases upset

conventional wisdom. Examples of these "new federalism" cases are United
States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison. In Lopez, decided in 1995, the
Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,16 which made it a
federal offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm ...at a place
' was
the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone,"161
unconstitutional. The Court found that the Act "neither regulates a commercial
activity nor contains a requirement that possession be connected in any way to
interstate commerce."' 62 The Act, therefore, exceeded Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause.
In Morrison, the Court, relying heavily on Lopez, held that the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994163 was also an unconstitutional exercise of
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause."6 This Act sought to afford a
private civil remedy for persons who were the victims of "crimes of violence
motivated by gender."' 6 5 The Court found that the necessary effects on interstate
commerce were simply66not present, at least when the regulated activity is
noneconomic in nature. 1

Lopez and Morrison raise two questions for our purposes. First, do they
represent, as some scholars have suggested, a new attitude of the Court with
respect to the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause? 167 Second, of

intended to apply.
159. E.g., Ann Althouse, The Alden Trilogy. Still Searchingfora Way to EnforceFederalism,
31 RUTGERS L.J. 631, 658 (2000); Richard A. Epstein, ConstitutionalFaith and the Commerce
Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 173 (1996).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2000).
161. Id.§ 922(q)(2)(A).
162. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). The Court did not rebut evidence
presented by the dissent that there were effects on commerce. Thus, Lopez might be read as holding
that if the statute does not regulate a typically "commercial" activity, the relationship between the
regulation and commerce must be direct. For an interesting comment on the case, see Donald H.
Regan, How to Think About the FederalCommerce Powerand IncidentallyRewrite United States
v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554 (1995).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
164. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,601 (2000). Interestingly, the states themselves,
the supposed beneficiaries of federalism, did not support the outcome that the Court reached in
Morrison. Only one state supported a pro-federalism position before the Court, while thirty-five
states took the position in amici briefs that Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause
to provide a federal tort remedy for gender-based violence. See Michael S. Greve, Business, the
States, and Federalism'sPoliticalEconomy, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 895, 910 (2002).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
166. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18 ("We... reject the argument that Congress may regulate
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate
commerce. The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly
local.") (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568).
167. E.g., MICHAELS. GREVE, REALFEDERALISM: WHY ITMATTERS, How IT COULD HAPPEN
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what relevance are those cases to the federal securities laws, inasmuch as they
invalidated acts of Congress while the constitutionality of the federal securities
laws were well established? As to the first question, this author does not believe
that Lopez and Morrison represent a sea change in constitutional adjudication
and, therefore, the Court's expansive reading of the Rule and other sections of
the federal securities laws is likely to be unaffected. Professor Nagel, in his 2001
book, The Implosion ofAmerican Federalism,took a longer view of the role of
the judiciary in preserving notions of federalism. He observed that "[t]he terms
of constitutional debate, as well as a sober assessment of the outcomes ofjudicial
cases, indicate that federal judges do not and cannot appreciate a robust
federalism."' 6 s Decisions in the past few years discussed in this Article confirm
his observation.
As to the second question, if Lopez and Morrison were harbingers of a new
jurisprudence, their effect should be felt in the interpretation of federal
statutes.169 That is, the Court should be sensitive to an interpretation, even

(1999); Steven G. Calabresi, A Government of Limited and EnumeratedPowers: In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752 (1995); Keith E. Whittington, Dismantling the
Modern State? The ChangingStructuralFoundationsof Federalism,25 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 483
(1998).
168. NAGEL, supra note 28, at 11; see, e.g., Allison H. Eid, Federalismand Formalism, 11
WILLIAM & MARY BILL RGTS. J. 1191, 1229 (2003) (observing that "[tihe federalism 'revival' is
a limited one").
169. The effect should also be reflected in a more robust reading ofthe Eleventh Amendment:
"[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any [suit], commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens of
Subjects of any Foreign States." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Indeed, several recent cases have
suggested that the Court vigorously enforces the federalism principles reflected in the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e.g., Bd.ofTr. ofUniv. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,374 (2001) (finding that
Title I of the American with Disabilities Act unconstitutionally abrogated states' immunity from
suit); Kimel v. Fla. Bd.of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (deciding that states are not subject to
suit under the Age Discrimination Act of 1967 despite provision in the Act subjecting states to suit);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that sovereign immunity bar announced in a
prior decision applies to lawsuits against states in state court); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,691 (1999) (invalidating the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act, which had subjected the states to federal lawsuits brought by business that
competed with the states complaining of false and misleading advertising); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647 (1999) (invalidating
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, which had expressly abrogated the
states' sovereign immunity from claims of patent infringement); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996) (finding that Congress cannot abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity when acting under its commerce power).
Cases from the last two terms, however, reflect restraint. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,
531 (2004) (holding that Congress acted within its powers in subjecting states to liability for
monetary damages under Title II of the American with Disabilities Act); Nev. Dep't of Human Res.
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003) (finding the State of Nevada subject to suit under the Family
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though constitutional, that stretches a statute beyond its apparent intent, which
is, of course, the Filburn dictum. But the post-Lopez cases do not support this
principle. Rather, the modem securities laws cases discussed above suggest an
expansive reading of the federal statutes regulating business.
The Court's broad reading of the federal securities laws over the past several
years is matched by the Court's interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"). 7 ' Unlike the Court's varied view of the federal securities laws,
however, the Court has more consistently taken an expansive view of the FAA.
In Southland Corp. v. Keating, 7' for instance, Chief Justice Berger, writing for
six members of the Court in 1984, ruled that the FAA established a substantive
rule of law that arbitration agreements are enforceable in state courts,'72 despite
the impressive legislative history assembled by Justice O'Connor that suggested
otherwise."' At issue was a California statute 174 protecting franchisees that,
according to the California Supreme Court,'7 5 entitled franchisees to litigate their
claims under the law in state court. The California court voided arbitration
clauses in franchise agreements. The Supreme Court reversed, thus deciding that
the FAA preempted the California statute. That Congress in 1925 intended to
create a substantive rule that state courts would have to enforce arbitration
agreements, even in the face of contrary state law, seems on its face at least
176
startling, if not incredible.
Justice Stevens, concurring in part, frankly
177
conceded as much.
The expansive reading of the FAA reflected in Southland was matched
during the period of "heightened sensitivity" to federalism in CircuitCity Stores
Inc. v. Adams,1 7' decided in 2001, well after Lopez was decided and a year after
Morrison came down. At issue in Circuit City was whether the FAA covered

Medical Leave Act of 1993, as Congress validly abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment rights
by invoking its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
170. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2000).
171. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
172. Id. at 16.
173. Id. at 21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
174. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 2005).
175. Keating v. Sup. Ct. Alameda County, 645 P.2d 1192, 1203-04 (Cal. 1982).
176. See Laura Kaplan Plourde, Analysis of Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams in Light of
Previous Supreme Court Decisions: An InconsistentInterpretationof the Scope and Exemption
Provisionsof the FederalArbitrationAct, 7 J. SMALL& EMERGING Bus. L. 145, 165 (2003) ("[I]n
1924, the year prior to the passage of the FAA, congressional Commerce Clause authority was
limited to items or persons 'engaged in commerce.' Further, the narrow understanding of
Commerce Clause authority continued through the drafting of the FAA.") (citations omitted).
177. Southland, 465 U.S. at 17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Although Justice O'Connor's review of the legislative history of the [FAA] demonstrates that the
1925 Congress that enacted the statute viewed the statute as essentially procedural in nature, I am
persuaded that intervening developments in the law compel the conclusion that the Court has
reached.").
178. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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ordinary employment contracts.
The FAA generally makes arbitration
agreements "evidencing a transaction involving commerce... valid, irrevocable
and enforceable," but exempts "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce."' 79 While a strong argument can be made that employment
agreements are not transactions involving commerce,180 and thus are not within
the scope of the FAA, earlier precedent foreclosed this question.' 8' Thus, Circuit
City focused on whether the exemptive provision included all employment
agreements "involving commerce," or only those agreements involving
transportation workers, as several appellate courts had previously held.'82 A
closely divided Court opted for the latter interpretation, giving a narrow reading
to the exemptive provision.'83
The liberal Justices dissented, probably reflecting a discomfort with the
notion of relegating employees to arbitration where, presumably, employers have
an advantage. The conservative Justices, on the other hand, were seemingly
protective of the freedom of contract, such as it is in these cases."' Scant
attention was paid by either side to whether this essentially private
transaction-a garden variety employment contact between a "sales counselor"
and a retailer of consumer electronics-is so "local" in character that, absent
clear congressional intention to the contrary, the FAA was unlikely to cover this
agreement.'8 5 No serious inquiry into congressional intent can take place without
considering what Congress believed its Commerce Clause power was in 1925
and whether, in the political climate of the time, Congress sought to encroach on

179. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000).
180. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 124 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Ifwe were writing on a clean
slate, there would be good reason to conclude that. . . the phrase. . . 'contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce' was [not] intended to encompass employment contracts.").
181. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
182. See McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1998); O'Neil v. Hilton Head
Hosp., 115 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997);
Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Rojas v. TK Commc'ns, Inc., 87
F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1995); Erving
v. Va. Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972); Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F.2d 783
(1 st Cir. 1971); Tenney Eng'g Inc. v. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir.
1953).
183. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 123-24.
184. The dissenters argued that the exemptive provision, added to the Act in response to
concerns expressed by organized labor, especially in the transportation industry, was intended to
make clear that employment agreements were not covered by the Act. Id.at 126-28. Thus, at least
arguably, Congress was making a concession to labor involved in the transportation industry, but
the rest of the exemptive provision was not a concession to labor interests, as there were doubts that
Congress could regulate private employment contracts outside of the transportation industry.
185. See also Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 53 (2003) (holding that debtrestructuring agreements executed in Alabama by Alabama residents satisfy the FAA's "involving
commerce" test).
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this traditional area of state regulation. The conservative wing of the Court was,
ironically, not more sensitive to this concern. This indifference to the states'
jurisdiction also reflected in the securities laws cases, makes Lopez and Morrison
seem more like outliers in a judicial agenda of expanding federal power, even at
the risk of offending congressional intent."8 6
Support for this view is evident in the Court's 2000 decision in Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co.'87 This case decided that a state law tort claim was
preempted by a regulation adopted by the Department of Transportation
mandating the phase-in of airbags by car manufacturers.' Although defendant
Honda was in compliance with the phase-in requirements, plaintiff claimed that
failure to include a driver side airbag in his 1987 Honda constituted negligence
under state common law. The Court upheld dismissal of the complaint,
reasoning that the plaintiff's claim was in conflict with the DOT standard,
despite a savings clause in the federal statute that provided: "Compliance with
a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a
person from liability at common law."'8 9 This savings clause was the basis for
a strong dissent by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Thomas.' 90 Again, with some exceptions, the conservative Justices tend to favor
the extension of federal power, with the liberal Justices in dissent. The real fault
line, however, at least for most of the Court, may be on the question of whether
a state law negligence claim with potentially significant damages should be
allowed to go forward when a plausible case for preemption exists. 9' In any
case, this Court has been aggressive in finding federal preemption,' 92 as

186. The Court's protective reading of the FAA carried the day in another case from the same
term, PacifiCareHealth Systems, Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003). In PacifiCare,the issue was
whether a provision in the arbitration agreement that precluded punitive damages rendered the
agreements unenforceable because the plaintiffs claimed relief under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization Act (RICO). RICO entitled successful plaintiffs to treble damages, which
they argued the arbitrators would be unable to award. Not so, ruled the Supreme Court, as the
arbitrator may find that such damages are remedial in nature. Id. at 405-06. In any case, the issue
was one for the arbitrator and not the courts to resolve. Id.at 407. Similarly, in Howsam v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 81 (2002), the Court decided that arbitrators should decide
whether arbitration was time-barred.
187. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
188. The regulation was adopted pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30127 (2000).
189. 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) (2000).
190. Geier, 529 U.S. at 886.
191. Some commentators have explained that Justices who favor a stronger form of federalism
are also committed to deregulation, which is often furthered by a liberal preemption doctrine. See,
e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism
Decisions,69 U. CHi. L. REv. 429,462,471 (2002); Jonathan D. Varat, FederalismandPreemption
in October Term 1999, 28 PEPP. L. REv. 757, 767 (2001).
192. See, e.g., Susan Raeker-Jordan, A Study in Judicial Sleight of Hand: Did Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co. Eradicatethe PresumptionAgainst Preemption?, 17 BYU J. PUB. L.
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suggested by several other cases from the same term.'93 Abstract notions of
federalism and the respect for state law that it entails seem to be far less of an
issue, despite the fact that the Court has, on several occasions, embraced a
94
presumption against preemption when state police powers are at issue.
The Court's broad reading of the Constitution is similar to the Court's broad
reading of federal statutes, evident in its evolving jurisprudence on the question
of punitive damages.' 95 Once thought to be the province of state law, 9 6 in recent

1, 8 (2002) ("Most blatantly, the Supreme Court's five-member majority ignored the long-standing
presumption against preemption .... "); Comment, FederalStatutes and Regulations, 114 HARV.
L. REv. 339, 339 (2000) ("[In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.], the Court once again chose
to disregard the presumption [against preemption].").
193. E.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 371 (2000) (preempting local
ordinance requiring boycott of Burma); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 359 (2000)
(preempting state tort liability); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 116 (2000); see also Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525,571 (2001) (finding that state regulations governing cigarette
advertising and sales preempted by Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act); Egelhoff v.
Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 150 (2001) (deciding that state law providing that upon divorce beneficiary
designations automatically revoked was preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341,353 (2001) (holding that the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act preempts state Fraud-on-the-FDA claims). More recent
cases also reflect the Court's willingness to preempt state law. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542
U.S. 200 (2004) (finding that ERISA preempts state court suits alleging that defendant HMOs failed
to exercise ordinary care under the Texas Health Care Liability Act); Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast
Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 258 (2004) (holding that California rule requiring fleet
purchases to meet certain emissions requirements was preempted by Federal Clean Air Act); Pierce
County, Wash. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 148 (2003) (deciding that Federal Hazard Elimination
Program's evidentiary privileges apply in state court proceedings as appropriate use of the
commerce clause). But see Sprietsmav. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51,69 (2002) (finding that state
tort action based on boat manufacturers' failure to provide propeller guards was not preempted by
Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971).
194. E.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) ("In all pre-emption cases, and
particularly in those [where] Congress has 'legislated . . . in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied,' we 'start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress."') (citations omitted); see also Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist.,
541 U.S. 246, 259-66 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S.
597, 605 (1991) (applying presumption against preemption to a local regulation).
195. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). The Court's preference for
federal solutions is evident in two other lines of recent cases-those dealing with the removal
jurisdiction of the federal courts and the spending power. The removal cases, while seemingly a
technical procedural issue, reveal the Court's strong preference for dispute resolution in the federal
courts as opposed to state courts. In a 2003 case, Beneficial NationalBank v. Anderson, 539 U.S.
1 (2003), for instance, the Court ruled that defendant National Bank could remove to the federal
courts a claim that only sought relief under state law because federal law (the federal National Bank
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000)) provided an exclusive remedy for usury, the wrong complained of by
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years the Supreme Court has created a federal jurisprudence to limit punitive
damages in cases arising under state law. In 1991, the Court held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment barred excessive punitive damage
awards. 197 Within a few years, the Court was earnestly seeking to apply this new
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 98 holding in 1993 that an award of
punitive damages "526 times greater than the actual damages awarded by the
jury"' 99 was constitutional and, in 1996, that a 500 to 1 ratio, under the
circumstances of the case, violated the Constitution. 00

the plaintiff. Id.at 3-4. The case represents an exception to the "well-pleaded complaint rule,"
under which removal is not permitted unless the complaint expressly alleges a federal claim. Id.
at 11. Beneficialbuilds and expands on earlier precedent that enlarged removal jurisdiction. Id.
In short, the majority indicated a distrust for state courts, which ought to dismiss the claim on the
basis of federal preemption. Id. Apparently fearing that state courts would not act accordingly, the
Court established a precedent of removal to the federal courts for resolution of the claim. Id.
As to the spending power, see Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004), which upheld
under the spending power, a federal statute that proscribed bribery of state and local officials of
entities, such as Minneapolis, that received at least $10,000 in federal funds. The Court held so
despite the lack of a connection between the federal funds and the alleged bribe, as an element of
liability. Id.at 605. See generally Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole:
Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine,and How a Too-Clever Congress Could
Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459 (2002) (discussing a loophole in the Court's opinion
restricting the spending power that would enable Congress to pass a statute expanding its spending
power).
196. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
197. In PacificMutualLife InsuranceCo. v. Haslip,499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991), the Court observed
that "unlimited jury [or judicial] discretion.., in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme
results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities." The Court went on to hold that the Due Process
Clause would address those sensibilities and guard against unreasonable awards. Id. at 17-24.
198. Many commentators have expressed their disagreement with this interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Steven L. Chanenson & John Y. Gotanda, The Foggy Roadfor
Evaluating Punitive Damages: Lifting the Haze From the BMW/State Farm Guideposts, 37 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 441 (2004) (proposing that highest comparable fine should be the presumptive
constitutional limit on a punitive damage award); Laura J. Hines, Due ProcessLimitations on
Punitive Damages: Why State Farm Won't Be the Last Word, 37 AKRON L. REv. 779 (2004)
(arguing that Court has failed to address several important issues in its punitive damages
jurisprudence); Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages Are
Unconstitutional,53 EMORY L.J. 1 (2004) (arguing that punitive damages as currently structured
are unconstitutional); Catherine M. Sharkey, PunitiveDamages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE
L.J. 347 (2003) (arguing for a reformulation of punitive damages as "societal damages").
199. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453 (1993).
200. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). The Court established three
guideposts for courts reviewing punitive damages to consider: (1) the degree of reprehensibility
of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by
the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages
awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. Id.at 575-

2005]

FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE LAW

The Court's most recent pronouncement, its 2003 opinion in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,2 °' suggests that federal courts
will be active participants in determining the appropriateness of state punitive
damage awards. Based on criteria developed in its 1996 decision in BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore,20 2 the Court decided that punitive damages awarded
by the Utah court were excessive. 2 3 Addressing the question of the appropriate
ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, the Court suggested that "in
practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process. '' 2°4 In
the following paragraph of the opinion, however, the Court further blurred this
already fuzzy standard:
Nonetheless, because there are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive
damages award may not surpass, ratios greater than those we have
previously upheld may comport with due process where "a particularly
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages."
... The converse is also true, however. When compensatory damages
are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory
damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.
The precise award in any case, of course, must be based upon the facts
and circumstances
of the defendant's conduct and the harm to the
2 °5
plaintiff.
Not surprisingly, this pronouncement drew some dissent, and Justice Scalia
wrote: "I am... of the view that the punitive damages jurisprudence which has
sprung forth from BMWv. Gore is insusceptible of principled application .... "206
Given the vague standards that the Court has delineated, Justice Scalia is
undoubtedly correct. In any case, the state role in determining punitive damages
has been diminished. While this may be a positive for American businesses, at
least in the short run, the Court's actions reflect another trend in the preemption
of state law, this time based on constitutional principles. Nevertheless, the
ability of states to experiment in this area of law, to limit arbitration, or to define
fiduciary duties, has been limited by the Court's nationalistic tendencies.
Whether these limitations will redound to the benefit of business in the long run
is an open question.
CONCLUSION

The modem securities laws cases, in contrast to cases such as Santa Fe and
Blue Chip Stamps, are nearly bereft of concern for state law. There are, of course,
86.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

538 U.S. 408 (2003).
517 U.S. 559 (1996); see supra note 200 for those criteria.
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 409-11.
Id. at 425.
Id.
Id at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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qualitative differences between the modem cases and the earlier ones discussed
here. Arguably, the modem cases neither result in a preemption of state law nor
have the potential of interfering with the allocation of power as among the
corporate actors-a chief concern in the Court's earlier opinions. But the
modem cases have a different, and no less important consequence: as a practical
matter, they preempt areas of law traditionally within the province of state law,
and endorse the displacement of states as players in the area of business law.
Individually, the encroachment of the modem cases is insignificant; collectively,
they fit neatly into a pattern of Supreme Court cases that stretches back to the
New Deal era and is unbroken by the decisions in Lopez and Morrison.0 7
One might ask, what of this? Arguably, there are some real and potential
consequences to this preference for a national solution. Imposing a national
solution to a problem, such as the misappropriation of confidential information
addressed in O'Hagan, results in the loss of potentially more efficient and
effective state solutions." 8 Allowing the states to craft rules in this area would
give rise to competition, and "[s]ubstantial evidence supports the proposition that
allowing contracting parties to choose the applicable law can increase
efficiency."2" 9
Moreover, as a matter ofjurisprudence, conduct that was once regulated by
the states now becomes a matter of federal law, even if state law is not directly
preempted. If the federal standard is more exacting or provides a longer statute
of limitations or greater damages, the state law may become obsolete. Carefully
crafted state causes of action are eliminated in favor of a federal claim. A state
statute of frauds that, for instance, might have prohibited claims based on oral
options would be preempted by Wharf. While the promulgation of the SarbanesOxley Act in 2002211 was met with considerable scholarly comment because it

207. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young,
Federalismand the DoubleStandardofJudicialReview, 51 DUKE L.J. 75 (2001) (noting how the
Court vigorously enforces individual rights but applies a different standard when considering states'
rights under the Constitution).
208. See generally Ribstein, supra note 84, at 155-58 (discussing the court's ambiguity in
interpreting the existence of federal insider trading).
209. Id.at 156.
210. In passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 118, 28, and 29 U.S.C.), Congress adopted a
wide-ranging approach to the perceived causes of the financial crises typified by Enron and
WorldCom. To the extent that these crises reflected a weakness in the regulation of the accounting
profession, for instance, Sarbanes-Oxley created an accounting oversight board. Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, §101, 116 Stat. at 750-53. Similarly, perceived weaknesses in the independence of the
company's auditors were addressed with new rules to limit non-audit services, to require audit
partner rotation, etc. Id.§§ 201-204, 116 Stat. at 771-75. The law also addressed corporate
governance directly in what might be characterized as two separate sets of initiatives. The first set
consists of changes in aspects of corporate governance that were already "federalized." Examples
include a new requirement that the company's chief executive officer and chief financial officer
certify the company's periodic filings with the SEC. Id. § 302, 116 Stat. at 777-78. This
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regulated aspects of corporate governance traditionally regulated under state law,
the Court's preemption of state law has received relatively little comment, but is
at least as important.
Finally, interpreting federal laws so as to displace state law inevitably results
in the arrested development of state law. This was the case for insider trading
when litigation under Rule 1Ob-5 effectively eliminated state claims.2 11 With
respect to insider trading, for instance, Professor Ribstein observed:
[I]t is unclear whether state law can survive in the shadow of federal law,
at least as long as investors can choose among state and federal remedies
ex post. Investor-plaintiffs plainly have incentives to choose the most
stringent remedy. This removes state lawmakers' incentives to compete
actively or to innovate regarding remedies that optimize costs as well as
benefits.212
From a jurisprudential perspective, this may be unfortunate as it spells the end
to the common law tradition of developing law to meet changing conditions.
Instead, the focus will shift to Congress and the federal courts to deal with an
ever-changing legal landscape. All this will have taken place without the full and
open debate that ought to accompany such a significant change in the law.

requirement alters the rules of corporate governance, as the functions and responsibilities of
corporate officers are typically matters of state law. However, the federal securities laws have
always specified who signs documents to be filed with the SEC, so requiring officer certification
to periodic reports did not reflect a significant change in the state-federal relationship.
The second set of initiatives, of greater importance here, are forays into what had been the
province of the states. These include forfeiture of certain bonuses and profits and a bar on loans
to officers and directors. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7243, §78(m)(k) (2005). Each of these provisions
addressed abuses at Enron and other companies, where officers realized substantial bonuses on the
basis of fraudulent financial statements and benefited from large loans from the company.
211. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 87, § 16.2.
212. Ribstein, supranote 84, at 157.

